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Alcan Aluminium Limited v. Franchise Tax Board:
State Unitary Apportionment of Foreign Parent
Income Taxation Will Have to Go
to State Court
I. Introduction
It is well-established that states cannot tax income earned
outside their territorial borders.' Yet, because of the difficulty in ac-
curately measuring the value earned by a corporation in a particular
geographical area, states are constitutionally permitted to use appor-
tionment formulas to determine taxable income. 2 California cur-
rently employs a controversial unitary apportionment formula
known as worldwide combined reporting to measure corporate taxa-
ble income.3 This formula has become a source of considerable ten-
sion between the United States and its major trading partners. 4
An apportionment formula is a mathematical approximation of
the taxable income properly attributable to a state from activities of a
worldwide unitary business conducted within that state. 5 The ap-
proximation an apportionment formula provides depends on the ex-
tent of the activities included in the apportionable base. There are
four types of apportionable bases used: separate entity base, water's
edge accounting, domestic combined reporting, and worldwide com-
bined reporting. 6 A formula using the separate entity apportionable
base includes income only from activities conducted within the
state. 7 The water's edge accounting method includes income from
activities conducted within the United States. The domestic com-
I Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164 (1983) (citing
ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982)).
2 Id.
3 CAL. REV. & TAx CODE §§ 25128-25137 (West 1979). Technically, California can-
not be classified as a unitary state since it passed repeal legislation effective January 1,
1988, enabling qualified taxpayers to make a "water's edge" election. See infra notes 31-35
and accompanying text. Alaska and North Dakota also apply worldwide unitary taxation.
ALAsKA STAT. § 43.20.065 (1985); N.D. CENr. CODE §§ 57-38.1-01 to -21 (1972).
4 Major trading partners include Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom, and most
other members of the European Community. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
5 See Note, State Unitary Apportionment of Foreign Corporations' Worldwide Income: It's Time
for the United States to Start Speaking With One Voice, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 91, 92 (1987).
6 See Note, U.S. Perspectives on Worldwide Unitary Taxation, 7 DICK. J. INT'L L. 213, 216-
17 (1989).
7 Id.
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bined reporting method includes income from activities of the tax-
payer corporation and its domestic subsidiaries and affiliates
wherever conducted.8 The "worldwide" method includes the in-
come of foreign affiliates earned outside the United States.9 The
most commonly employed apportionment formula is:
In-state property + In-state payroll In-state sales+ +
Total property Total payroll Total sales Total Income
X Corporate = Taxable
3 Income By State
All intracorporate transactions are eliminated in this formula.' 0
Some foreign parent corporations have attempted to contest the
state tax assessment of their U.S. subsidiaries by suing for injunctive
or declaratory relief in the federal courts. Until the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Alcan Aluminium Limited v. Franchise Tax Board,I I foreign
parents had been denied standing to challenge a formula's constitu-
tionality under the traditional rule that a shareholder may not initiate
an action to enforce the rights of the corporation unless the corpora-
tion's management has refused to pursue the same action.' 2 In Alcan
Aluminium, the court held that the foreign parents had sustained inju-
ries sufficiently "direct and independent of the injuries incurred by
their subsidiaries to confer standing."' 3 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, recently reversed that decision.' 4 In reversing Alcan, the Court
did not address the standing of foreign parent corporations. With-
out deciding whether the foreign parents would have standing, the
Court held that the plaintiffs were nevertheless barred from bringing
suit in federal court under the Tax Injunction Act.15
This Note begins with a synopsis of the reasons underlying the
dispute over California's unitary apportionment formula and with a
brief chronicle of the actions taken by the federal government and
California in attempting to settle the controversy. An analysis of the
Seventh Circuit's decision and the Supreme Court's reasoning for its
subsequent reversal follows. The Note concludes with an examina-
tion of the likelihood of the formula's constitutionality should the
Supreme Court hear one of several unitary tax cases currently pro-
ceeding in California state courts.
8 Id.
9 Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations: Reflections on Mobil,
Exxon, and H.R. 5076, 79 MICH. L. REV. 113, 156-59 (1980).
10 White & Nack, State Tax Litigation After the Container Decision, 20 TAX NOTES 771
(1983).
1 860 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 661 (1990).
12 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988). See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
13 Alcan Aluminium, 860 F.2d at 690.
14 Alcan Aluminium, rev d, 110 S. Ct. 661 (1990).
15 See infra notes 66-91 and accompanying text.
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II. Background
Since the Supreme Court's decision upholding the constitution-
ality of the worldwide apportionment method in Container Corp. v.
Franchise Tax Board,16 many trading partners have threatened 7 to
curtail investment' 8 in the United States or take retaliatory meas-
ures 19 against American corporations operating abroad. Foreign
corporations and their domiciliary governments complain that the
tax inaccurately reflects the income earned within a particular
state. 20 In opposition to the worldwide unitary tax, it is argued that
affiliated corporations subject to such a tax are allocated a higher
portion of income than are affiliated corporations in other jurisdic-
16 463 U.S. 159 (1983). The Court upheld California's application of worldwide
combined apportionment to the worldwide income of domestic-based multinational cor-
porations. However, the Court expressly left open the question of the constitutionality of
the forumula when applied to "domestic corporations with foreign parents or foreign cor-
porations with either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries." Id. at 189 n.26.
17 Methods of protest include letters to the Treasury and State Departments, amicus
curiae briefs filed in unitary apportionment cases, and actual or threatened implementa-
tion of retaliatory measures. See Note, State Unitary Apportionment, supra note 5, at 103-107.
Sixteen countries filed amicus briefs against the unitary method in Alcan Aluminium.
18 A letter to both the State and Treasury Departments from EEC countries, Japan,
Canada, Australia, and Switzerland stated "[olur governments are deeply concerned about
the use of the worldwide unitary basis of taxaton .... [Federal restrictive action] would
represent the removal of a serious obstacle to the further development of our trade and
investment relationships." Letter to Donald T. Regan, U.S. Treasury Secretary, and Allen
Wallis, Undersecretary of State (Jan. 27, 1984) (available in 22 Tax Notes Microfiche Data
Base Doc. No. 84-1212 (Feb. 20, 1984)).
Keidanren, the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations, also protested by
sending a delegation to Washington, D.C. in 1984 to argue for the repeal of the state
unitary tax laws. Seiki Tozaki, chair of C. Itoh & Co., Ltd. and leader of the delegation,
announced that 40 Japanese companies who are heavily invested in the United States
would not make any new or additional investments in unitary method states, and may leave
them altogether. Meanwhile, Kyocera International, Inc., a U.S. subsidiary with ajapanese
parent, sold two of its plants in California. See Sheppard,Japan, Inc. Reinforces Complaints
About the Unitary Method, 22 TAx NOTES 653 (1984); see also Vorldwide Application of Unitary
Tax. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy of the Senate Foreign Relations
Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1984).
19 Britain's Parliament passed enabling legislation denying tax treaty benefits to cer-
tain United States-based corporations operating in Britain but incorporated or having
their principle place of business in a unitary state. Finance Act, 1985, ch. 54, sched. 13
(Gr. Brit.), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 735 (1986). See also Note, State Unitary Apportionment, supra
note 5, at 106-07. However, following President Reagan's statement of his intent to pro-
pose federal legislation and California's passage of a repeal bill, the British government
announced it would not take action under the retaliatory legislation for the time being.
British Embassy Information Department, Press Release at 2 (Dec. 18, 1986) (available in
33 Tax Notes Microfiche Data Base Doc. No. 86-7934 (Dec. 22, 1986)).
20 See lVallis Tells Working Group That Unitary Method Discriminates, 21 TAX NOTES 1219,
1219 (1983):
The essence of our trading partners' complaint is their sense that the unitary
method is an inaccurate reflection of income earned within ajurisdiction, one
at odds with the manner in which business is actually conducted. They feel
that separate accounting more nearly approximates income earned and
avoids the discriminatory burdens imposed by the unitary method on foreign
businesses operating in the United States.
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
tions due to inflated payroll and property costs in the United
States.2 ' Foreign corporations also argue that the unitary method re-
sults in double taxation of their foreign-source income. 22
Proponents of worldwide unitary apportionment retort that, in
addition to ease of administration, use of the method prevents a mul-
tinational corporation from shifting income to affiliated companies in
lower tax jurisdictions.2 3 Since many multinational corporations are
highly integrated with activities transcending geographic boundaries,
unitary tax states argue that the method is a more accurate measure
of the income properly attributable to them. 24 Finally, and probably
most importantly, states allege they would lose a substantial amount
of revenue if the method were repealed. 25
In an attempt to ameliorate this deepening tension, President
Reagan appointed a task force known as the Working Group to ad-
dress the issue and formulate a compromise.26 In its final report, the
Working Group advocated three principles: (1) water's edge unitary
combination for both U.S. and foreign companies; (2) increased fed-
eral administration assistance and cooperation with the states to pro-
mote full taxpayer disclosure and accountability; and (3) competitive
balance for businesses.2 7
In 1985, after it became apparent that all states were not going
to adopt the Working Group's suggestions, President Reagan pro-
posed the incorporation of those principles into an act of Con-
21 Worldwide unitary apportionment assumes similar operating costs and economic
conditions. If operating costs, such as payroll or raw materials, are higher in an American
state then in a country where an affiliated company is located, it results in income being
apportioned to the American state which is attributable to the other country. See also J.
Hellerstein, STATE TAXATION: CORPORATE INCOME AND FRANCHISE TAXES 373-75 (1983);
General Accounting Office, KEY ISSUES AFFECTING STATE TAXATION OF MULTIJURISDIC-
TIONAL CORPORATE INCOME NEED RESOLVING 36-37 (July I, 1982) [hereinafter GAO
Report].
22 See, e.g., GAO Report, supra note 21, at 35-36. If a state apportions income of a
corporation to itself that is attributable to a foreign affiliate and the domicilary country of
the foreign affiliate does not provide a tax credit, the corporation is taxed twice on one
source of income. Id. For an extensive dicussion of the enhanced risk of multiple taxation
in the foreign-based multinational corporation context, see Note, State Worldwide Unitary
Taxation: The Foreign Parent Case, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 445, 462-66 (1985).
23 GAO Report, supra note 21, at 35-36.
24 See Note, State Worldwide Unitary Taxation, supra note 22, at 446-47; see also Keesling,
A Current Look at the Combined Report and Uniformity in Allocation Practices, 42J. TAX'N 106, 107
(1975).
25 One commentator reports that under the proposed federal restrictions in 1986
North Dakota could possibly lose $7.5 to $9 million, and California $80-$150 million,
whereas Alaska would absorb no loss at all. Note, State Unitary Apportionment, supra note 5,
at 96 n.27.
26 Ferguson, Worldwide Unitary Taxation: The End Appears Near, 4 J. ST. TAX'N 241, 242
(1986).
27 Id. at 243; Chairman's Report on the JIorldwide Unitary Taxation Working Group: Activi-
ties, Issues and Recommendations, 24 TAX NOTES 581, 581 (1984). The group was unable to
reach an agreement on the treatment of foreign dividends or of corporations with 80% of
their activities outside the United States. Id.
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gress.28 Accordingly, what was called the Unitary Tax Repealer Act 29
was introduced in the Senate. The proposal would "prohibit[] the
use of worldwide unitary taxation in favor of a water's edge limita-
tion, restrict[] state taxation of foreign source dividends, and re-
quire[] corporations to file a full disclosure spreadsheet report with
the Internal Revenue Service." 30
California has also taken steps to quiet this dispute. In 1986,
California amended its franchise tax statute to allow a "unitary
group" to make a "water's edge" election. 3' The advantage of this
election is that a qualified taxpayer 32 is only required to take into
account the income and apportionment factors of the members of its
water's-edge group.3 3 The foreign corporation still incurs a tax but
only on activities conducted within the United States. Nevertheless,
the extremely stringent requirements 34 for inclusion in the group
often result ultimately in subjecting the corporation to worldwide
unitary taxation.3 5
Many countries with investments in the United States remain
dissatisfied despite the actions taken by the federal government and
California. 3 6 Although only three states still employ37 the unitary
method, critics contend there is nothing to prevent other states from
enacting it in the future. 38 Thus, many foreign countries and affected
28 In a statement on November 8, 1985, President Reagan announced:
We hoped that by this time these principles would have been enacted by the
various states that have unitary taxation. Since states have not universally
accepted these principles, I am instructing the Secretary of the Treasury to
initiate the process of crafting Federal legislation to incorporate these princi-
ples into law and work with the Congress for passage.
Ferguson, supra note 26, at 254.
29 S. 1974, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 17,975-78 (1985). Ultimately, no
action was taken on this bill.
30 Agosstini, U.S. Perspectives on Worldwide Unitary Taxation, 7 DICK.J. INT'L L. 213, 224
(1989).
31 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 660 (codified at CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 25110). Worldwide
unitary taxation is still provided for in § 25101.
32 Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 251 10(b)(2).
33 Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 25110(a). See Dushkes, California's Unitary Tax System, 16
BARRISTER 54, 55 (1989).
34 Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 251 10(a)(8)(A).
35 See Note, U.S. Perspectives on Worldwide Unitary Taxation, supra note 6, at 225.
36 See Note, State Unitary Apportionment, supra note 5, at 115.
37 When President Reagan appointed the Working Group twelve states employed the
worldwide unitary method. They included Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
Indiana, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon and Utah. Fer-
guson, supra note 26, at 242. Soon after the Working Group's final report was released in
1984, Oregon, Florida, Massachusetts, Idaho, Indiana, and Colorado repealed the
method. Id. at 245. Since then, Montana, New Hampshire, and Utah have also relented.
38 "[A] haphazard array of individually adopted State water's edge solutions replete
with various 'election' fees and other objectionable provisions, will not provide an appro-
priate solution." Note, State Unitary Apportionment, supra note 5, at 116 n. 181 (quoting State
Taxation of Multinational Business: Hearings Relating to the Description of S. 113 and S. 1974 Before
the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the Senate Committee on Finance, 99th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 4 (1986) (statement of Thomas H. Boggs, Jr., on behalf of Unitary Tax Cam-
paign, Ltd.)). "Other objections include: (1) concern for a stable system since "without
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foreign corporations continue to press for preemption by federal
legislation or judicial disapproval by the Supreme Court. 39 Affected
foreign corporations are, nevertheless, only able to litigate claims
through their domestic subsidiaries in state court due to the Court's
decision in Alcan Aluminium Limited v. Franchise Tax Board.4
III. Alcan Aluminium Limited v. Franchise Tax Board
Alcan Aluminium Limited ("Alcan") and Imperial Chemical In-
dustries ("Imperial") are foreign corporations with domestic subsidi-
aries doing business in California. 4 1 Alcan is a Canadian company
and the sole stockholder in Alcan Aluminium Corporation ("Al-
cancorp"), an Ohio corporation. 42 Imperial is a British holding com-
pany which owns over 50% of ICI Americas, Inc. ("Americas"), a
Delaware corporation. 43 California's Franchise Tax Board ("FTB")
assessed franchise taxes against both Alcancorp and Americas under
California's worldwide unitary apportionment formula.
Federal legislation, States which act to limit worldwide unitary taxation may reverse such
legislation decisions at any time;" and (2) need for "a consistent water's edge scheme
which would increase certainty for business transactions and reduce the cost of complying
with many widely varying State laws." Id.
39 The Second and Ninth Circuits have both denied federal jurisdiction to foreign
parents challenging the unitary tax. In Shell Petroleum, N. V v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1012 (1983), the plaintiff was a Netherlands corporation seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief from California's unitary method as applied to two of its
American subsidiaries. The court denied jurisdiction because the "method of taxation
that [the plaintiff] seeks to enjoin does not injure [the plaintiff] directly or independently
of the corporation." Id. at 595. The court also held that the United States-Netherlands
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation does not confer standing on the Nether-
lands corporation because a domestic corporation would not have had standing to enjoin
assessment of the tax. Id. at 596.
In EMI Ltd. v. Bennett, 738 F.2d 994 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984), the
Ninth Circuit held on remand that EMI Ltd., a British corporation with American subsidi-
aries, had not sustained injuries directly or independently of the harm to its subsidiaries.
Hence, the plaintiff lacked standing under the traditional shareholder standing rule. In
addition, the treaty between the U.S. and the United Kingdom relied upon by EMI did not
grant special status to stockholders which thereby conferred standing. Id. at 998.
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the Tax Injunction Act did not bar an action
by the parent corporation. Capitol Industries-EMI, Inc. v. Bennett, 681 F.2d 1107, 1119
(1982). The court noted, however, that to allow "a parent corporation to bring an action
in federal district court ... could result in the circumvention of state remedial procedures
that [the Tax Injunction Act] was intended to prevent." Id. at 1119 n.32.
The Second Circuit has also denied standing to a foreign parent. Alcan Aluminium
Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 742 F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1984).
Alcan first brought a nearly identical suit in the Southern District of New York. The dis-
trict court stayed federal court action, including the standing issue, pending resolution of
Alcan's claims in state administrative proceedings. Subsequently, the Second Circuit de-
nied Alcan standing. The FTB did move to dismiss this action in the district court on
collateral estoppel grounds but was unsuccessful. They failed to raise the issue on appeal
thus the Seventh Circuit would not address it. Alcan Aluminium Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
860 F.2d 688, 695 n.9 (7th Cir. 1988).
40 110 S. Ct. 661 (1990).
41 Alcan Aluminium, 860 F.2d at 690.
42 Id.
43 Id.
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Alcan and Imperial brought separate suits seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief from the unitary apportionment method on the
grounds that application of the method to domestic subsidiaries of
foreign corporations violates the Foreign Commerce Clause44 and
inhibits the ability of the United States to speak with 'one voice' in
matters of foreign policy. The district court found the plaintiffs were
injured only in their capacity as shareholders and thus dismissed the
suit for lack of standing.45 The Seventh Circuit reversed. 46
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis with an examination of
the two restrictions on parties seeking access to the federal courts.
In Order to have standing, parties must overcome both constitutional
and prudential limitations on the exercise of a federal court's juris-
diction to have standing.47 The first restriction flows from article III,
section 248 of the Constitution. The court stated that "the party who
invokes the court's authority [must] show that he personally has suf-
fered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively
illegal conduct of the defendant" 49 and that the injury "fairly can be
traced to the challenged actions and is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision."' 50 The court held that the direct harm the plain-
tiffs suffered as "participants in foreign commerce" satisfied the
standing requirement in article III. 5 1
The bulk of the opinion focused on the traditional shareholder
rule encompassed in the prudential limitations on standing.52 The
court, agreeing with the FTB, acknowledged that long-settled equita-
ble restrictions prevent shareholders from initiating a cause of action
belonging to the corporation unless they have made a demand on
the board of directors to pursue the cause which has been unjustly
denied. 53 The court reasoned that these restrictions prevent share-
holder suits from circumventing the limits on diversity jurisdiction or
undermining managerial decisionmaking. 54 The court concluded
that the facts in this case did not indicate a strike suit or an attempt
44 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
45 Alcan Aluminium Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., Nos. 84 C 6932, 84 C 8902, mem. op.
at 8-10 (N.D. III. July 29, 1987) (1987 WL 15386).
46 Alcan Aluminium Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 860 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1988).
47 Id. at 691.
48 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
49 Alcan Aluminium Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 110 S. Ct. 661, 663 (1990) (quoting
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).
50 Id. (quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41
(1976)).
51 Alcan Aluminium, 860 F.2d at 692.
52 "[P]rudential guidelines [are ones which] the Court [has] developed, for its own
governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction." d. at 692 (quoting Ashwan-
der v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936)).
5 Id. at 693.
54 Id. A strike suit in this context is a derivative action brought by the shareholder to
elicit a lucrative settlement from management rather than to force them to pursue the
cause.
1991]
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to manipulate diversity jurisdiction. 55
Despite its conclusion, the court questioned the "wisdom" of
hearing the case.5 6 The court reiterated the well-settled exception to
the shareholder rule-namely, that a shareholder may bring suit if
the shareholder has incurred injuries sufficiently direct and in-
dependent of the corporation even if the legal rights of the corpora-
tion are also implicated. 57 The plaintiffs argued that the double
taxation of income and the increased cost of acquiring the additional
information necessary to figure the tax are sufficiently direct injuries
to confer standing. The court disagreed, characterizing the expenses
as administrative costs experienced by the foreign parent "as share-
holders in an enterprise faced with increased costs." '58
Nevertheless, the court of appeals held that the shareholders of
foreign parents do incur sufficiently direct injuries when their do-
mestic subsidiaries are viewed as instrumentalities of foreign com-
merce. 59 The court reasoned that the unitary tax's potential to
discourage ownership of American subsidiaries because of a tax bur-
den higher than that of conducting business through independent
contractors provided the plaintiffs' strongest argument for stand-
ing.60 The court was careful to note it was not deciding the merits by
holding that the burden on foreign commerce conferred standing.6'
The defendants argued that the principles of comity and federal-
ism, which have been partially codified in the Tax Injunction
Act 62should preclude the plaintiffs' action in federal court. The Tax
Injunction Act prohibits federal interference with matters of state
taxation where a state court remedy is available. The court dis-
missed the Act as inapplicable for lack of such remedy by the foreign
parents. 63 In addition, principles of comity and federalism underly-
ing the Act were not weighty enough to invoke the court's discretion-
ary power to deny access to the federal courts in the absence of a
state court remedy. 64 Interestingly, the court also relied on consider-
55 Id. at 694.
56 Id. The court noted that "wise judicial administration" entails the "conservation
of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation," and went on to state
that "conservation ofjudicial resources can only in 'exceptional circumstances' justify the
withholding of federal jurisdiction in spite of 'the virtually unflagging obligation of the
federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.' " Id.
57 Alcan Aluminium, 860 F.2d at 693.
58 Id. at 696.
59 Id. at 697.
60 Id. The court thought it important that the merits of the case have fueled an inter-
national controversy between the United States and its trading partners. Id. at 699.
61 Id. at 697 n.10. "Evaluation of the constitutional significance of the threat in the
particular circumstances presented by California's unitary tax must await the district
court's assessment of the merits of this appeal. We decide only that the potential for con-
stitutionally significant offense is sufficient to create standing." Id.
62 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
63 Alcan Aluminium, 860 F.2d at 698.
64 Id. at 699.
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ations of international comity in its reasoning. 6 5 Apparently, the
court felt that the implications of the tax on U.S. foreign relations
weighed in favor of a federal court hearing the case. However, as
noted above, the court said it was not deciding the merits. Ironically,
the Tax Injunction Act is the precise ground on which the Supreme
Court based its reversal.
In a rather short opinion the United States Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the Seventh Circuit and held, without decid-
ing the standing issue, that the plaintiffs' federal action was barred
under the Tax Injunction Act. 66 To better understand the Court's
decision, it is necessary to examine the Tax Injuntion Act and the
Court's interpretations in prior decisions.
The Tax Injunction Act provides that "Itihe district courts shall
not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of
any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy
may be had in the courts of such State."'67 The Supreme Court has
interpreted this limitation broadly. In Rosewell v. LaSalle National
Bank,68 the Court held that a state court remedy will be considered
"plain, speedy and efficient" so long as it meets "certain minimal
procedural requirements. '6 9 Thus, if the state court procedure pro-
vides the taxpayer with a "full hearing and judicial determination of
the controversy at which [he] may raise any and all constitutional ob-
jections to the tax," it is procedurally sufficient within the meaning of
the Act. 70
In Rosewell, the plaintiff, as beneficial owner of an apartment
building, challenged the tax assessment of her property. After an
unsuccessful administrative appeal, the plaintiff refused to pay the
taxes and brought suit in federal court seeking injunctive relief on
the grounds that the excessive tax deprived her of equal protection
and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 ' The Supreme
Court found that the Act barred federal jurisdiction because the Illi-
nois refund procedure was a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy"
despite a two year delay before the taxpayer would receive a re-
fund. 7 2 The Court underscored the congressional awareness at the
time of the adoption of the Act that most states provided refund pro-
cedures as a means of challenging an assessment. The Court felt
that this awareness implied that Congress considered state court
65 The court stated that foreign governments view California's unitary method as a
"serious injury to multinationals located within their borders and a threat to commercial
relations with the United States." Id. at 698.
66 Alcan Aluminium Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., I 10 S. Ct. 661, 667 (1990).
67 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
68 450 U.S. 503 (1981).
69 Id. at 512-15.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 506-07.
72 Id. at 515. Moreover, no interest on the refund is paid for the two year delay.
1991]
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remedies to satisfy this test.73 The Court also emphasized that, as in
1937, the dependence of state budgets on the receipt of local tax
revenues and the potential disaster on state tax administration com-
pels federal noninterference in state tax issues. 74
The Supreme Court has also held that the Tax Injunction Act
prohibits actions for damages 75and declaratory relief as well as in-
junctions. In California v. Grace Brethren Church,76the Court reasoned
that prohibiting taxpayers from seeking injunctive relief in federal
court while allowing them to seek a declaratory judgment would un-
dermine the principal purpose of the Act because there is little prac-
tical difference between the two. The Court, citing Rosewell,
reemphasized that the congressional intent in enacting the Tax In-
junction Act was "to limit drastically federal district court jurisdic-
tion to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of
taxes."77
In Tully v. Griffin, 78the Court stressed that the "statute has its
roots in equity practice, in principles of federalism, and in recogni-
tion of the imperative need of a State to administer its own fiscal
operations." '79 In Great Lakes Dredge & Dodge Co. v. Huffman 80and Fair
Assessment In Real Estate Association v. McNary,8 1 the Court, while de-
clining to decide whether the Tax Injunction Act would necessitate
the same result, denied federal jurisdiction in both cases under the
principle of federalism. The Court in McNary held that "[t]he
scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state govern-
ments which should at all times actuate the federal courts, and a
proper reluctance to interfere by injunction with their fiscal opera-
tions, require that such relief should be denied in every case where
the asserted federal right may be preserved without it."'82
The Supreme Court's decision in Alcan Aluminium seems consis-
tent with the Tax Injunction Act's history of federal deference to
state courts on matters of state tax; however, it is a rather broad in-
terpretation of the Act's language. The Court acknowledged that the
Act had not previously been construed so broadly as to deny federal
jurisdiction to a "nontaxpayer who lacks a remedy in state court...
on the ground that an affiliated taxpayer possesses adequate state
73 Id. at 523; see also H. R. REP. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937).
74 Id. at 527.
75 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
76 457 U.S. 393 (1982).
77 Id. at 417 (quoting Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 522 (1981)).
78 429 U.S. 68 (1976).
79 Id. at 73.
80 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
81 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
82 Id. at I I I (quoting Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 298
(1943)).
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court remedies." 83 The Court maintained, however, that allowing
the, respondents to bring an action in federal court when they di-
rected and controlled a party having an adequate state court remedy
would be to elevate form over substance.8 4
The Court also dismissed the respondents' contention that they
lacked an adequate state court remedy because their subsidiaries
would not be permitted to raise a Foreign Commerce challenge to
California's unitary tax.8 5 The respondents argued that the subsidi-
aries were not within the class of foreign investors protected by the
Foreign Commerce Clause and therefore they could not adequately
litigate their foreign parents' claims. 8 6
Previously, the Supreme Court has held that a remedy that is too
uncertain or speculative is not "plain" within the meaning of the Tax
Injunction Act and thus not sufficient to deny jurisdiction.8 7 In Alcan
Aluminium, the Court relied on the FTB's reassurance that the "Cali-
fornia courts would entertain and decide any issues the respondents
desire to present."8 8 At first, this faith in the California courts ap-
pears rather speculative. However, the Court provided the caveat
that, should California courts refuse to hear the argument, the result
under the Tax Injunction Act "might well be different." 89 In fact, the
Court's reliance in this instance was not misplaced because there are
two cases 9°currently in the California courts involving plaintiff-sub-
sidiaries that have successfully raised the foreign commerce challenge.
Alcan Aluminium is unusual because a decision on the procedural
issue would largely influence the substantive issue.9 1 By declining to
decide the standing issue, the Supreme Court successfully avoided
providing any insight on their opinion of the merits.
83 Alcan Aluminium Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 110 S. Ct. 661, 666 (1990).
84 Id. Cf. South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367f(1984). Regan involved the Anti-
Injunction Act, which prohibits the enjoining of the assessment or collection of any tax by
any person whether or not such person is the one being assessed. The Court held that
because South Carolina had no alternative remedy and could not be made to rely on a
third party to raise its claim, it was not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act from challenging
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act. In responding to Justice O'Connor's con-
cern that the decision would enable taxpayers to evade the Act by forming organizations to
litigate their claims, thereby appearing not to have a remedy themselves, the Court stated
that that would elevate form over substance to treat such organizations as if they did not
possess alternative remedies. Id. at 381 n.19.
85 Alcan Aluminium, 110 S. Ct. at 666-67.
86 Id.
87 See Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1981); California v.
Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 415 n.31 (1982).
88 Alcan Aluminium, 110 S. Ct. at 667.
89 Id.
90 Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., No. 319715 Cal. Super. Ct. (Dec. 12,
1988); Barclays Bank Int'l v. Franchise Tax Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 626, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1342
(1990). See infra notes 142-178 and accompanying text.
91 Respondent Alcan Aluminium argued that the court could not decide the standing
issue without also reaching the merits. See Sheppard, Multinational Forum Shopping: Supreme
Court Hears Alcans Caliormia Unitary Challenge, 45 TAx NOTES 674, 676 (Nov. 6, 1989).
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In 1983, the Court was faced with a strikingly similar case in
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board.9 2 The Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of California's unitary tax when applied
to a domestic parent with foreign subsidiaries. Chief Justice Burger,
Justice Powell and Justice O'Connor dissented, arguing that the
formula violates the Foreign Commerce Clause.93 Since ChiefJustice
Burger and Justice Powell have retired from the bench, there re-
mains only one of the three dissenting justices in Container Corp. of
America v. Franchise Tax Board. It is not possible to glean from the
Alcan Aluminium decision whether four additional justices believe that
California's method is unconstitutional when applied to a foreign
parent with domestic subsidiaries.
IV. Foreign Commerce Clause Implications
Although the Supreme Court failed to reach the merits in Alcan
Aluminium, most commentators agree that worldwide apportionment
violates the Foreign Commerce Clause and should be declared un-
constitutional.9 4 The framework for analysis of this issue was estab-
lished in two prior Supreme Court decisions: 95 Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles96and Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board.9 7
92 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
93 Id. at 197 (Powell, J., dissenting).
94 See Note, Foreign Multinationals and the Commerce Clause: Should the States Mind Their
Own Business, 41 TAX LAW. 785-801 (1988); Note, The Container Aftermath: The Unconstitution-
ality of California's Unitary Corporate Tax Concept as Applied to a Foreign Parent Corporation, 25
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 633, 639 (1985).
95 In addition to Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd. and Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, the following cases are also relevant but do not add any significant
insight to the analysis: Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1
(1986) (Florida's tax on aviation fuel sold within the State to airlines regardless of whether
the fuel was used to fly within or without the State, or whether the airline engaged in a
substantial amount of business in Florida did not violate the Foreign Commerce Clause.
The Supreme Court found that the federal government had affirmatively acted to approve
a state tax on aviation fuel); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S.
354 (1982) (New Mexico's tax on a portion of the dividend received by a domestic parent
from its foreign subsidiaries failed to meet due process standards because the parent and
subsidiaries were not a unitary business); ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458
U.S. 307 (1982) (Idaho's attempt to tax interest and capital gains was a violation of due
process because the parent and its subsidiaries were not a unitary business); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980) (Vermont's application of an apportion-
ment formula to foreign source dividend income of appellant received from its subsidiar-
ies operating abroad did not violate the Due Process or Commerce Clauses. The Supreme
Court found that taxation by apportionment did not produce a significantly greater tax
burden than taxation by allocation.); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978)
(Iowa's single factor sales formula to apportion the income of an interstate business did
not violate the Due Process or Commerce Clauses. Appellant was an Illinois corporation
that sold goods manufactured in Illinois to Iowa customers through Iowa salesmen and
warehouses. The Supreme Court held that the existence of duplicative taxation as be-
tween Illinois and Iowa was speculative.); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447
U.S. 207 (1980) (Wisconsin's application of an apportionment formula to appellant's total
income did not violate the due process clause because Exxon's activities in Wisconsin were
an integral part of a unitary business).
96 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
[VOL. 16
WORLDWIDE UNITARY TAXATION
A. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles
The validity of a state tax under the Commerce Clause is deter-
mined according to a four prong test. The four requirements of the
test are that: (1) the tax is only applied to activities that have a sub-
stantial nexus with the taxing state; (2) the tax is fairly apportioned;
(3) the tax does not discriminate against interstate or foreign com-
merce; and (4) the tax is fairly related to the services provided by the
state.9
8
In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, the Supreme Court
held that, in determining the constitutionality of a state tax imposed
on an instrumentality of foreign commerce, two requirements in ad-
dition to the four prong test must be met. The tax must not: (1)
create a "substantial risk of international multiple taxation;" or (2)
prevent "the Federal Government from 'speaking with one voice'
when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments."-99
The facts of Japan Line involved an ad valorem property tax on
Japanese cargo containers temporarily present in California. 100 The
Court assumed, without deciding, that the tax met the four standard
requirements, but held it did not satisfy either of the two additional
conditions. 101
First, because the containers were taxed at their full value in Ja-
pan, the California tax resulted in actual double taxation.' 0 2 The
Court relied on previous decisions requiring that taxes on interstate
commerce "be apportioned among taxing jurisdictions, so that no
instrumentality of commerce is subjected to more than one tax on its
full value."' 0 3 The Court recognized that neither the government
nor the courts of the United States have the authority to correct
malapportioned taxes imposed on foreign commerce by a foreign
country. 10 4 Assuming it would be consistent with the custom of na-
tions, a foreign country could also tax the entity or activity at its full
value which would necessarily result in multiple taxation. Thus,
due to the absence of an authoritative tribunal capable of ensuring
that the aggregation of taxes is computed on no more than one full
value, a state tax, even though 'fairly apportioned' to reflect an in-
strumentality's presence within the State, may subject foreign com-
merce to the risk of a double tax burden to which [domestic]
commerce is not exposed, and which the commerce clause
forbids. 105
97 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
98 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
9 9 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451.
100 Id. at 436.
101 Id. at 445-46.
102 Id. at 447.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 id. at 447-48.
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The Court also held that the tax impeded the nation's ability to
"speak with one voice" in its foreign relations and foreign trade. 10 6
The Court relied on the Customs Convention on Containers, 0 7 to
which Japan and the United States are signatory, as establishing the
need for uniformity in this area.' 0 8 The Court also noted the asym-
metry created by California's tax as well as the risk of international
retaliation in evaluating the need for uniformity. 10 9
B. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board
In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, the Supreme
Court upheld the validity of California's unitary method as applied to
a U.S. corporation domiciled in the United States with foreign sub-
sidiaries. I10 The Court reserved judgment, however, on whether the
method would be constitutional with respect to "domestic corpora-
tions with foreign parents or foreign corporations with either foreign
parents or foreign subsidiaries." I I
The Court admitted four similarities between the facts of Japan
Line and Container Corp." 12 First, in both cases the foreign entity was
subjected to actual double taxation. Second, the double taxation
flowed from "a serious divergence" in the tax practices adopted by
California and those used by the foreign taxing authorities.' '3 Third,
there was congruity between the foreign tax practice and the interna-
tionally accepted method. Fourth, the federal government "seemed
to prefer" the method employed internationally." 14
Despite these similarities, the Court held that the unitary
method applied in this context satisfied the additional conditions re-
quired under the Foreign Commerce Clause. The Court found the
cases to be constitutionally different in three ways. First,Japan Line
involved a property tax rather than an income tax." 15 The Court re-
marked that it had previously distinguished property taxes from in-
come taxes in cases upholding apportionment formulas."16
106 Id. at 449.
107 Customs Convention on Containers, May 18, 1956, United States-Japan, 20 U.S.T.
301, 304, T.I.A.S. No. 6634.
108 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 452.
109 Id.
10 463 U.S. 159 (1983). The rationale of formula apportionment depends on the
existence of a "unitary business." "A unitary business may be defined as a single business
conducted both within and without the taxing state and whose tax base cannot be satisfac-
torily identified on a geographical basis." Hellerstein, supra note 9, at 122 n.50. Formula
apportionment is constitutional only in the case of a unitary business. Asarco, Inc. v.
Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
III Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 189 n.26.
112 Id. at 187.
113 Id.
114 Id.
I15 Id. at 187.
116 Id.
[VOL. 16
WORLDWIDE UNITARY TAXATION
Second, the Court found that the existing double taxation was
"not the 'inevitabl[e]' result of the California taxing scheme,"" 7 and
thus did not meet the substantial risk of multiple taxation test. The
Court held that the additional scrutiny required under the Foreign
Commerce Clause must include "the context in which the double
taxation takes place and the alternatives reasonabl[y] available to the
taxing State."' 18 The Court reasoned that, depending on the facts of
each case, California would not necessarily eliminate double taxation
by adopting the "arm's length" method. Accordingly, its apportion-
ment formula did not create a substantial risk of multiple taxation." 9
Finally, the Court reasoned that the legal incidence of the tax
fell on a domestic corporation rather than a foreign entity, meaning
that "such taxation was in reality of local rather than international
concern."120 This factor weighed heavily in the Court's conclusion
that the tax did not violate the second requirement of Japan Line.
In analyzing the second requirement, the Court held that the
one voice standard is violated if the tax "either implicates foreign
policy issues which must be left to the Federal Government or vio-
lates a clear federal directive." 12' The Court noted that one obvious
foreign policy implication would be international retaliation against
the United States as a whole. The Court recognized, however, that
the judiciary has "little competence in determining precisely when
foreign nations will be offended by particular acts, and even less
competence in deciding how to balance a particular risk of retaliation
against the sovereign right of the United States as a whole to let the
States tax as they please."' 22 Accordingly, the Court, in finding for-
eign policy not implicated, used objective factors to analyze the
threat of foreign retaliation. First, the tax did not create "automatic
asymmetry in international taxation."' 123 Second, the tax was techni-
cally imposed on a domestic corporation rather than a foreign en-
tity. 12 4 And third, California could produce the same economic
result by simply raising its corporate tax rate.' 25
The Court also noted that the executive branch had failed to file
an amicus brief in the case opposing the unitary method which raised
doubts about whether there was any real concern that U.S. foreign
' "7 Id. (quoting Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 447 (1979)).
118 Id. at 189.
119 The Court summarily dismissed the alternative of California not taxing the income
of the foreign company at all, which was the result in Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,
441 U.S. 434 (1979).
120 Id. at 196.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 195.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
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policy was being seriously threatened.' 2 6
C. Foreign Parent Corporations with Domestic Subsidiaries
A case involving a foreign parent with domestic subsidiaries is
constitutionally distinguishable from Container Corp. for several rea-
sons. First, although the legal incidence of the tax still technically
falls on a domestic corporation, it is the foreign parent corporation
that incurs the economic consequences. Besides the fact that it is
that company's income that is subjected to double taxation, the par-
ent corporation will effectively be responsible for the tax as a parent
company. Thus, the Court's reliance on the local nature of the con-
cern in Container Corp. is inapplicable in this context. In light of its
holding in Alcan Aluminium that the parent corporation and subsidi-
ary corporation are in reality one entity with respect to an available
remedy in state court, the Supreme Court could hardly hold that
they are two separate entities for this purpose.
Second, unitary taxation as applied to foreign parent corpora-
tions with domestic subsidiaries interferes with the federal govern-
ment's ability to "speak with one voice when regulating commercial
relations with foreign governments."1 27 In Container Corp., the Court
divided the "one voice" standard into two parts. The tax is unconsti-
tutional if it: (1) "implicates foreign policy issues which must be left
to the Federal Government;" or (2) "violates a clear federal direc-
tive." 128 The threatened retaliation of U.S. trading partners clearly
implicates foreign policy. 129 The discontent of foreign trading part-
ners has been expressed through letters from foreign nations to the
Treasury and State Departments, actual and threatened reduction of
investment in unitary states, and preliminary retaliatory legislation
passed by one of the strongest allies of the United States.' 30 Also,
sixteen countries and the Justice Department1 3' filed amicus briefs in
Alcan Aluminium opposing the unitary tax method in California. 132
Amici from foreign countries emphasized that the tax is contrary to
established principles of international taxation and a major impedi-
ment to investment in the United States.1 33
. Finally, President Reagan's initiative in December 1985 promot-
ing federal legislation which would prohibit worldwide unitary ap-
portionment clearly demonstrates the executive branch's position on
126 Id.
127 Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
128 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194.
129 Id.
13o See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
131 SeeJustice Takes Unusual Step By Filing Amicus Curiae Brief in California Unitary Tax Case,
161 J. AccT. 18 (1986).
132 See Uhlfelder, Sixteen Countries File Amicus Briefs Against Unitary Mlethod; California Uni-
tary Legislation Introduced, 30 TAx NOTES 498 (Feb. 10, 1986).
'33 Id.
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the issue. 134 Although the Commerce Clause states that "Congress
shall have the power," it is understood that the executive branch
shares control with Congress over foreign affairs. t 35Justice Powell in
his dissent in Container Corp. questioned the majority's finding that
the executive branch had not expressed a desire for a uniform policy
when the Solicitor General had filed an amicus brief opposing a uni-
tary formula in a case pending before the Supreme Court at the same
time as Container Corp. 136
Furthermore, although the analysis under the first prong of the
test announced in Japan Line would be the same in the foreign parent
case as in Container Corp., the Court's reasoning behind its holding
that California's unitary method satisfied this prong is questionable.
The Court found that there was no substantial risk of multiple taxa-
tion because both methods could result in double taxation. The
Court discounted the reality of double taxation resulting from the
inherent inconsistency of unitary apportionment with international
practices even though in Japan Line it had recognized the significance
of the custom of nations in striking down California's ad valorem
property tax.' 3 7 As Justice Powell pointed out in his dissent, there is
an inherent risk of multiple taxation in this context because formula
apportionment is fundamentally different from the separate account-
ing or arm's length method used in many foreign jurisdictions. 38
Admittedly, as Justice Powell argues, there is a risk of multiple taxa-
tion due to differences in application even if California conformed to
international practices. 139 However, the risk stems from the differ-
ence in application and not the inherent difference between the uni-
tary method and the arm's length approach which can only be
eliminated by changing the system itself.' 40 Moreover, the Court ig-
nored previous cases where it had stated that the validity of appor-
tionment taxation lies in "[the court's] ability to enforce full
apportionment by all potential taxing bodies."' 4' The United States
does not have the authority to ensure that foreign income is sub-
jected to only one tax on its full value by foreign tax authorities.
D. California Lower Court Decisions
Currently, there are two cases proceeding through California
state courts in which worldwide unitary apportionment has been de-
134 See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
135 See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 196.
136 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 197 (Powell, J., dissenting).
137 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453.
138 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 198-99 (Powell, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 201 (Powell, J., dissenting).
140 See Allen, The Container Corp. Case: The Unitary Tax in the United States and as Perceived
by the International Community, 18 INT'L LAW. 127, 140 (1984).
141 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 447-48. Full apportionment ensures that no more than
100% of a corporation's income is apportioned and taxed.
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clared unconstitutional. In Barclays Bank International v. Franchise Tax
Board, 142the California Court of Appeals affirmed the superior
court's holding that California's income apportionment method vio-
lates the Foreign Commerce Clause when applied to the domestic
operations of foreign based corporations. The court distinguished
Container Corp. on the ground that it involved a domestic parent cor-
poration with foreign subsidiaries. 143
In another case, Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Board,144 a
California superior court held the worldwide method unconstitu-
tional because it "impermissibly interfere[s] with the federal govern-
ment's power to conduct foreign affairs."' 45 The court found it
highly significant that there was a showing of an express policy of the
executive branch-evidenced by press releases and letters- that the
worldwide unitary apportionment method should be limited. 146 It is
interesting to note that the plaintiff in Colgate-Palmolive was a domes-
tic corporation with foreign subsidiaries similar to Container Corp.
The court distinguished Container Corp. by the clear and express pol-
icy the executive branch has since promulgated in condemning the
worldwide unitary apportionment as detrimental to U.S. foreign
policy. 147
It does not appear that the Supreme Court would be able to
uphold the decision in Colgate-Palmolive without overruling Container
Corp. In Container Corp., the Court relied heavily on the reasoning
that the tax fell on a domestic entity and was therefore more of a
local than international concern.' 48 This is also true in Colgate-
Palmolive.
Unlike Colgate-Palmolive, Barclays is an excellent opportunity for
the Supreme Court to declare worldwide unitary apportionment un-
constitutional in the foreign parent context. 149 The superior court in
Barclays held that California's unitary method violated both the Due
Process and Foreign Commerce Clauses.' 50 The court did not ex-
pressly address the four prong Commerce Clause test under Complete
Auto Transit, although as explained below the court effectively held
142 Barclays Bank Int'l v. Franchise Tax Bd., 225 Cal. App. 3d 1342, 275 Cal. Rptr.
626 (1990).
143 See Unitary Method, 35 TAX NOTES 1320 (1987).
144 Colgate-Palmolive, No. 319715 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 1988).
145 Hilker & Karalewitz, Colgate-Palmolive: The Beginning of the End?, 8 J. ST. TAX'N 89
(1989).
146 See Newpol, California Worldwide Reporting Stopped at Waters Edge, 8 J. ST. TAX'N 92
(1989).
147 Hilker & Karalewitz, supra note 145, at 91.
148 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 196.
149 Barclays does not face the procedural obstacles that other cases have faced in the
past. See Note, Foreign Multinationals and the Commerce Clause: Should the States Mind Their Own
Business, 41 TAX LAW. 785-801 (1988).
150 Barclays Bank Int'l, No. 325059 (Cal. Super. Ct.June 16, 1987), repinted in 1987 Cal.
Tax Rep. (CCH) 24,917, 24,927-28, 24,929-30.
[VOL. 16
WORLDWIDE UNITARY TAXATION
that it was not satisfied. Instead, the court first analyzed the addi-
tional conditions required underJapan Line. 151
The court held that Container Corp. mandated the result under
the first prong of the Japan Line test, which prohibits a "substantial
risk of international multiple taxation."' 52 Although there was actual
double taxation in this case, the same arguments available here ad-
dressing multiple taxation were heard and rejected in Container
Corp. 153 Thus, the method met the first requirement of the Japan Line
test. ' 54
The method failed, however, to pass the second part of Japan
Line. The court found that the method implicated foreign policy in
an area which required federal uniformity within the meaning of
Container Corp.' 55 The court recognized that the custom of nations
was the arm's length method and concluded that, because Califor-
nia's method differed from the international practice, it necessarily
implicated foreign policy.156 The court found that the international
community perceived the unitary method as an "arbitrary, unfair,
and predatory measure of income taxation."' 57 The court further
stated that it was irrelevant whether the perception was justified or
that the unitary method might actually be a more accurate measure
than arm's length.' 58 The court reasoned that if the international
community holds this perception then the states are impermissibly
conducting foreign affairs.1 59 The court then created a presumption
that when a foreign corporation's income is included in the income
base for figuring formula apportionment then the corporation's
domicile country will be offended, which thereby implicates foreign
policy.' 6 ° The court relied heavily on the fact that the tax impact falls
on a foreign rather than domestic parent. 16 1
On appeal, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the supe-
rior court's holding that the formula violated the Foreign Commerce
Clause but declined to address the due process challenge.' 62 The
appeals court found that the worldwide combined reporting method
failed to satisfy the second prong of the Japan Line test when applied
to foreign parent corporations with foreign and domestic subsidiar-
151 Id. at 24,924-28.
152 Id. at 24,928.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 id. at 24,926-27.
156 Id. at 24,927.
157 Id. at 24,926.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 24,928.
161 Id. at 24,926.
162 Barclays Bank Int'l v. Franchise Tax Bd., 225 Cal. App. 3d 1342, 275 Cal. Rptr.
626, 646 (1990).
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ies. 163 Although the application of the formula did not inevitably re-
sult in double taxation, it did implicate foreign policy issues as well
as violate a clear federal directive.' 64
The court found the incessant protest letters from foreign na-
tions and Great Britain's retaliatory legislation to be strong evidence
of foreign policy implications. 165 In addition, the court found the
three general factors present that the Supreme Court identified in
Container Corp. as possibly leading to significant foreign retaliation. 166
First, the unitary method resulted in automatic asymmetry because
no other country in the world employed this method. 16 7 Second, the
court heavily relied on the fact that the legal incidence of the tax fell
on a foreign rather than domestic corporation. 6 8 Third, the court
found the tax burden was more a function of California's allocation
method than its tax rate.' 6 9 The court relied on the greater adminis-
trative burdens imposed on a'foreign based corporation as evidence
of foreign policy implications, but refused to hold that the increased
compliance costs alone were sufficient to invalidate the method. 170
The court also found that the worldwide combined reporting
method violated a clear federal directive.1'1 In finding the federal
directive, the court relied on evidence showing that the executive
branch has opposed the method for four administrations, the testi-
mony of a senior career official at the Treasury Department, Presi-
dent Reagan's initiative in urging federal legislation, and Secretary
of State Shultz's letter to the governor of California urging him to
end California's use of the worldwide method.' 7 2
The court rejected the Franchise Tax Board's argument that the
federal government had indicated its acquiescence in the states' us-
ing the worldwide combined reporting method through its treatment
of the issue in treaty negotiations.173 Specifically, the Board argued
that the following five factors demonstrated an affirmative federal
policy which therefore rendered a dormant commerce clause analysis
unnecessary: "(1) the failure to consider state taxes in United States
income tax treaties with foreign countries, except in nondiscrimina-
tion clauses; (2) the actions by the executive branch in adopting a
Model Income Tax Treaty and in reserving its position on the Or-
ganization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
163 Bardays Bank, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 638.
166 Id. at 638-4 1.
167 Id. at 638.
168 Id. at 639.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 640.
171 Id. at 641-42.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 634-37.
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Model Convention's application to subnational taxes; (3) Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) Treaties to which the United
States is a party do not require the states to use any particular
method of tax accounting; (4) the absence of enacted congressional
legislation prohibiting or restricting the states' use of [worldwide
combined reporting]; and (5) the rejection by the United States Sen-
ate of article 9(4) in the United States-United Kingdom Tax Treaty,
the only attempt by the executive branch to alter federal acquies-
cence in the states' use of [worldwide combined reporting]."' 7"
The court reasoned that the treaties the Board relied on in fac-
tors (1) through (3) predated the application of worldwide combined
reporting to foreign corporations and thus their failure to prohibit
its application provided little support for federal acquiescence.' 75
In response to the absence of federal legislation prohibiting world-
wide combined reporting, the court refused to engage in "pure spec-
ulation" to determine the reason for congressional inaction.176
With respect to the fifth factor, the court explained that the ex-
ecutive branch had negotiated a tax treaty with the United Kingdom
which included a provision that prohibited the states from using
worldwide combined reporting. 77 The treaty was not ratified by the
Senate, however, until that provision was removed. The Board ar-
gued that the Senate's refusal to ratify the treaty with the restriction
indicated congressional approval. The court, however, refused to at-
tribute the Senate's action to approval of states' using the worldwide
combined reporting method.' 78
Neither the appeals court nor the superior court in Barclays had
to go as far as they did to find California's unitary method unconsti-
tutional. Rather, the method should be held unconstitutional be-
cause it discriminates against foreign commerce in violation of the
four part test set forth in Complete Auto Transit. The superior court in
Barclays did not expressly state that the method failed to satisfy the
standard Commerce Clause test in Complete Auto Transit, although
that is the effect of its holding.
California's method is unconstitutional because it discriminates
between domestic and foreign based corporations. In California, the
income from a foreign parent's foreign subsidiaries as well as the
foreign parent itself is required to be included in figuring the base
from which taxable income is calculated. The problem arises be-
cause foreign corporations maintain their records according to the
appropriate accounting principles in their domicile countries which
174 Id. at 634.
175 Id. at 634-35.
176 Id. at 636.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 636-37.
1991]
N.CJ. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
are often not in accord with U.S. principles.' 79 The information nec-
essary to take advantage of tax reporting benefits under California's
unitary method is not readily available to foreign parents and is ex-
tremely expensive to obtain.' 80 Furthermore, for comparability pur-
poses foreign corporations must translate their records from foreign
currency into U.S. dollars.' 8 ' This can be very complex and often
requires "extensive effort."' 8 2 The Franchise Tax Board admitted
that literal compliance with California's worldwide unitary method
was financially prohibitive for most foreign parents.' 8 3 The appeals
court noted that it would cost millions of dollars for Barclays to es-
tablish and maintain the information necessary to comply with Cali-
fornia's unitary tax method.' 8 4 The estimates ranged from $6.4
million to $7.7 million to establish a system and $2 million to $3.8
million to maintain it.185 This amounts to economic protectionism
because California is affording benefits to other corporations that
foreign parents cannot take advantage of because of the costs associ-
ated with the information requirements. The federal government
can employ economic protectionism policies against foreign coun-
tries; the individual states cannot.18 6
Impermissible discrimination is a stronger reason for finding the
unitary method violative of the Foreign Commerce Clause. When a
state's taxing scheme has the effect of disadvantaging foreign corpo-
rations to the advantage of domestic corporations, it is unconstitu-
tional. 8 7 The purpose of the Commerce Clause is to ensure that the
United States conducts its foreign affairs as one nation and not as
fifty separate entities.188 Just as one state could not directly impose
an embargo or tarriff on a foreign country, it cannot do so indirectly
179 See Barclay's Bank, 1987 Cal. Tax Rep. (CCH) at 24,928. See also Comptroller General
Report, Key Issues Affecting State Taxation of Multjurisdictional Corporate Income Need Resolving 38,
40 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 GAO Report].
180 1982 GAO Report, supra note 179, at 37-40.
181 Id. at 39-40.
182 Id.
183 Barclay s Bank, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
184 Id. at 640.
185 Id.
186 See South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 99-101 (1984) (foreign
commerce burdened by embargo on export of unprocessed timber cut from state forests).
See also Board of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933) ("In
international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the
United States act through a single government with unified and adequate national
power.").
187 See Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) where
the Court stated:
As in the context of cases alleging violations of the dormant interstate Com-
merce Clause, the concern in these Foreign Commerce Clause cases is not
with an actual conflict between state and federal law, but rather with the pol-
icy of uniformity, embodied in the Commerce Clause, which presumptively
prevails when the Federal Government has remained silent.
188 See id.
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through income taxation.'8 9
The appeals court refused to hold that the compliance costs
alone were sufficient to invalidate the worldwide combined reporting
method as unconstitutionally discriminatory.' 9 0 The court cited Bibb
v. Navajo Freight Lines 91'for the proposition that cost alone is not
enough to impermissibly burden interstate commerce. Apparently,
the appeals court was persuaded that the statement that "[c]ost taken
into consideration with other factors might be relevant in some cases
to the issue of burden on commerce" indicated that cost is only
sometimes relevant and in no case determinative. 92 Yet, in Bibb, the
Supreme Court rejected appellants' contention that no burden on
interstate commerce is sufficient to invalidate local safety regulations
absent some element of discrimination.' 9 3 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court drew a distinction between measures that place an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce and measures
which are unconstitutionally discriminatory. 194 The Supreme Court
found that the costs of the Illinois safety statute requiring a specified
type of rear fender mudguard placed an impermissible burden on
interstate commerce even though the statute was nondiscriminatory.
The statute applied to any motor vehicle of the second division. 19 5 It
did not distinguish between out of state trucks and in state trucks.
"This is one of those cases - few in number - where local safety meas-
ures that are nondiscriminatory place an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce."196 Implicit in that statement is the notion that
discriminatory safety measures are unconstitutional.
The discriminatory nature of the increased compliance costs for
foreign based corporations distinguishes Barclays from Bibb. The un-
constitutional element is not just the burden itself but the discrimi-
natory nature of the burden. In Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising
Commission,'9 7 the Supreme Court held violative of the Commerce
Clause a North Carolina statute requiring that all apples sold or
shipped into North Carolina in closed containers be identified only
by the applicable federal grade or the designation that the apples are
189 See Hallburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 70 (1963) ("Equality for the
purposes of competition and the flow of commerce is measured in dollars and cents, not
legal abstractions."). See also Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318
(1977) (New York transfer tax on out-of-state securities transactions held to discriminate
against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause). "No State, consistent
with the Commerce Clause, may impose a tax which discriminates against interstate com-
merce ... by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business." Id. at 329.
19o Barclays Bank, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
191 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
192 Id. at 526.
193 Id. at 529.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 521 n.I.
19( Id.
197 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
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not graded. The Court found the statute impermissibly discrimi-
nated against Washington apple growers and dealers by increasing
their costs of doing business in North Carolina while North Carolina
growers and dealers remained unaffected.' 98 Similarly, California's
worldwide combined reporting method discriminates against foreign
based corporations by increasing their compliance costs while leav-
ing domestic based corporations unaffected.
In addition, striking down California's method as unconstitu-
tionally discriminatory eliminates the need to evaluate what the pos-
sibility of foreign retaliation is and whether the Congress or
executive branch has an implicit or explicit policy addressing the is-
sue. In its decision, the Barclay's court appeared to rely heavily on
the fact that the executive branch had disfavored the worldwide uni-
tary method for four administrations in finding that the issue impli-
cated foreign policy. 199 This analysis would not hold up if the next
President suddenly favored the unitary method.
Moreover, the court in Barclay's attempted to perform a balanc-
ing which the Supreme Court has recognized as being inappropriate
for the courts: weighing the possibility of foreign retaliation against a
state's sovereignty interest.200 The court heavily relied on evidence
that there had been actual threats of foreign retaliation in concluding
that there was a need for federal uniformity which outweighed the
state's typically weighty sovereignty interest in areas of state taxa-
tion.20 1 The court rejected the argument that much of the contro-
versy surrounding the unitary tax had been contrived by the domicile
country of the foreign parent corporation in this case (Great Britain)
to create an apparent need for federal uniformity.
If the court had instead based its decision solely on the discrimi-
natory nature of the method, it would not have to reach the question
of whether the threatened retaliation was genuine or contrived.
VI. Conclusion
Although the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Tax Injunc-
tion Act appears quite broad, it seems justified when considered in
light of the federal policy not to interfere in state tax matters. Yet,
the Alcan Aluminium decision does prevent foreign corporations from
asserting a claim involving a state tax matter in which they are not
technically the actual taxpayers and arguably creates another impedi-
ment to foreign investment in the United States. Foreign parent cor-
porations will not want to invest in the United States via a subsidiary
198 Id. at 351.
199 Barclays Bank Int 'l, No. 325059 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 16, 1987), reprinted in 1987 Cal.
Tax Rep. (CCH) 24,931, 24,925.
200 Id. at 24,928. See also Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983).
201 Barclays Bank Int'l, 1987 Cal. Tax Rep. (CCH) at 24,926.
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knowing they can only contest what is in essence a direct economic
injury indirectly through their subsidiaries in a potentially biased
state forum.
California's unitary tax frustrates the current United States phi-
losophy of globalizing its capital markets and encouraging direct for-
eign investment. A foreign corporation may perceive its investment
alternatives as mutually exclusive: either do business in California or
not do business in the United States. If a foreign corporation knows
that it will be financially prohibited from purchasing or creating a
subsidiary company and partcipating in California's lucrative market
because of the state unitary tax, it may become economically infeasi-
ble for the corporation to invest in the United States at all.
The worldwide unitary apportionment method should be de-
clared unconstitutional because it violates the Foreign Commerce
Clause. Although the issue was not squarely before the Court in Al-
can Aluminium, it no doubt lies on its future agenda. It is hoped that
the Supreme Court will seize the opportunity to settle this hotly con-
tested legal, political, and economic issue.
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